Josherich's Blog

Welcome to this special live edition of the Sinica Podcast, coming to you from the University of California, Berkeley. Hello, Berkeley. All right. So, I want to hear. I want to thank Sophie Volpin, Xiaojie Ma, and, of course, Rachel Stern, who just introduced us from the Center for Chinese Studies at the Institute for Asian Studies here at Cal for making this happen.

What a delight it is to be back at my alma mater, a place where, even knowing everything I now know about higher education, I would enroll here again if I could, without hesitation. But, of course, now I would never, never get in. It’s possible. Anyway, Cal absolutely made me the person that I am today. My four years spent here were just some of the best and most memorable years of my life where I made friendships that have literally just endured to this day.

My best friend, freshman year in the dorm. Spends Black Hall, room 107, unit three. Yeah, all the way to today. Ate way too much blondies and top dog. I’m still definitely going to get up there and eat some top dog while I’m here. So, in this program, of course, as you know, we look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that can help us better understand what’s happening in China’s politics, foreign relations, economics, and society.

Join me each week for in-depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to how we think and talk about China. Sinica, of course, is supported this year by the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a national resource center for the study of East Asia. The podcast is going to remain free. It’s been free. It will always be free.

But if you truly value the work that I do and you work for an organization that believes in what I’m doing with this podcast, definitely consider lending your support. Just as Cal Berkeley has and just as the University of Wisconsin-Madison has. You can get me at Sinicapod at gmail.com. I love getting email from people. Email me.

If I had to come up with just two people who I would entrust with the stewardship of American policy toward China, people who I believe have the clearest picture of the challenges that China does and, just as importantly, does not pose to the United States, who have both the intellect and, just as importantly, the temperament, the skills, the analytical ability, the whole package, those two people undoubtedly would be Jessica Chen-Weiss and Ryan Haas.

So you can just imagine how thrilled I am to have them both here with me in Berkeley to talk about the future of the U.S.-China relationship in light of the dramatic developments we’ve already seen. It is really no exaggeration to say that in the few short months that we’ve been planning this event, the world has just undergone, to borrow a phrase, changes not seen in a century.

Let me briefly introduce our two guests and then jump right in and pick their brains about the U.S.-China relationship in the recent past, by which I mean the Biden administration, which feels like a decade ago. Oh my God. But yeah, the Biden administration and, of course, the present and possible scenarios for the future, should we actually live to enjoy one.

Jessica Chen-Weiss is the David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. She is the inaugural faculty director of SAIS’s Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs. You should listen on the Seneca podcast. We’ve been running some of the… We have got another one dropping later this week of the fabulous session that she ran called Getting China Right. And it’s the first of many that she’s going to be running.

So you’ve heard her, I hope, at least on podcasts like The Ezra Klein Show and even Jon Stewart. And, of course, you’ve read her, I hope, in Foreign Affairs and many other prominent publications where she’s been one of the most forceful, persuasive voices of reason in the discourse on U.S. and China. And, of course, you’ve heard her several times on Seneca. So, Jessica, welcome back to Seneca. It’s just so wonderful to have you.

Wonderful to be here. Thanks so much, Kaiser. Also returning to Seneca for what? What is it like, a fourth time now? I think something like that, fourth or fifth time, is Ryan Haas. Ryan is the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, as well as serving as the Chintu and Cecilia Yenku Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings.

Ryan served as the China director at the National Security Council during President Obama’s second term, 2013 to 2017, and had many years of experience in China and in other places as a Foreign Service officer. I just learned while we were in the green room that he took the Foreign Service exam at the age of 22 while hungover. You’re not hungover today, though, I trust.

You do like that. That’s so funny. The important details. Anyway, he has published extensively in outlets like Foreign Affairs, which, you know, articles he’s presumably wrote in a state of perfect sobriety. And, of course, publishes regularly on the Brookings website. Ryan, a very warm welcome. I’m sorry for that little anecdote. I couldn’t help it.

And both of you, so great to be with you here in Berkeley. Well, thank you so much, Kaiser. It’s great to be back with you. I appreciate you having me back on the show. And for my parents who are listening, I am dead sober today. I hope they are. I hope they are.

So, Ryan, I’m going to start with you. With the benefit of hindsight, how should we evaluate the Biden administration’s approach to China over the last, what was it? It was like, what, 10 years? No, the last four years. I mean, you wrote this terrific and very candid piece talking about what worked, what didn’t work, what some of the fundamental flaws were.

I mean, you might recall, I had a conversation with the late, great Jeff Bader, who I’m sure you knew well when you were both in the administration. And, you know, he wrote a not so flattering piece about the Biden administration’s approach. He had some critical perspectives that I think you shared in your own piece. Would you summarize what you argued in that piece and maybe offer a sense of what, if anything, you would have advised the administration to do differently?

Well, thank you, Kaiser. The piece actually was dedicated to Jeff Bader, and so he was a mentor to me and to others in this room. The basic premise that I tried to advance was that on the merits, the Biden administration did pretty well. When they left office, alliances were stronger. The American presence in Asia, in Europe, and elsewhere was in a stronger position than it was when they arrived.

And the American economy on a relative basis was in a much stronger position than it was when they arrived in office. So on the merits, I think that they did pretty well. However, I think that they came up short in a few areas. My two big critiques are, first, that they prioritize politics above policy and strategy. Whenever there was a tension between something that could be politically advantageous and strategically misplaced or vice versa, they always erred on the side of politics over policy and strategy.

That was my first critique. The second critique basically was a critique on storytelling, that promoting an idea of pursuing a steady state of managed competition isn’t an idea that rolls off the tongue particularly well. It’s not something that inspires people to rise above their seats and to sacrifice in service of the common good. They missed an opportunity to tell a story about why Americans should care, what we should care about, and what we should be trying to accomplish in our competition with China.

And when there is no affirmative vision, when there is no story to be told about what we’re trying to achieve and why, we often have a vacuum, a vacuum that gets filled by what China is doing to us. And it makes Americans feel vulnerable. It makes us feel insecure. And when we feel insecure and vulnerable, we feel like we have leaders that lack strength. And it creates a vicious cycle that leads us back into a dynamic where politics drive policy, which is where, unfortunately, I think we ended up.

Very good. I would very, very heartily endorse and agree with that. Jessica, though, you were actually in the State Department in policy planning under Secretary Blinken during the Biden administration when some of the really crucial decisions were made. And I know that after you left government, you were critical about some of the Biden team’s policies toward China. But like Ryan, I know you think they got some things right, too.

So, I mean, maybe you could share with us your perspective on the good and the bad. And for you, do you think that the main missteps grew out of wrong assumptions about not getting, not right-sizing the China challenge, as it were? Was it limitations imposed by domestic politics, as Ryan pointed out, always choosing politics over smart policy and strategy? Was it problems with the execution of policies? What went wrong?

Well, there’s a lot there to unpack. And I very much share Ryan’s very succinct, I think, diagnosis. We’re very much on the same page there. You know, I think that to start off with, I think, you know, one of the things that the Biden administration did right, I think, was to try to restore American standing and leadership in the world, build back the trust of allies and partners, that the United States could be a credible force for good.

Of course, they were somewhat hamstrung by the ability to, you know, do more with less, right? And I think that the domestic politics there, particularly in Congress, made that somewhat difficult. And I think that they spent more time than ideal on rebuilding what Secretary Blinken liked to call a position of strength, which, of course, went down very poorly with China, which saw that as, well, you should, the Chinese should remain perpetually subordinate to you.

And that, of course, that’s not a great place for beginning a conversation, which, but I think, you know, the second half of the Biden administration, there was very much more of an emphasis on stabilizing what had become a kind of rapid descent into greater potential conflict and confrontation. So I think there’s two kind of phases of the Biden administration. It’s important that in the latter half, we give credit for other efforts to resume some channels of communication, right?

So that was important. But I don’t think that they, we or they left themselves enough time, or really thought boldly enough about how to really institutionalize that and put wins on the board that, as you know, Ryan said, that was like show that a stable relationship actually delivered benefits for Americans. So we left alone or intact the sense that of grievance.

And, you know, we’ll see where diplomacy leads us, you know, what kind of diplomacy between the United States and China we see in the new administration. I think it’s pretty early yet, but I think that the fact that there weren’t yet enough wins, although I think that they were real in terms of cooperation on counter narcotics and cracking down on the fentanyl precursors, I think that was important, but it was pretty late.

And so in terms of showing the value of that approach toward the latter half, I think it would be too easy to undo a lot of that in the months and years to come. So I think that there was a, and to Ryan’s point, I think that the narrative really, the Biden administration really left in some ways unchanged or with some modifications, the narrative that the first Trump administration pursued adopted of this being fundamentally a strategic competition for what? For, you know, dominance of the world, right?

And I think that one of the challenges that that creates is it sets up a zero-sum competition between the United States and China for something that I’m not even sure that the United States or China really wants anymore, right? And of course, dominance, we can say, oh, we want to be number one and dump our chest, but like truly leadership of the world, I feel like we may be, that we’re chasing something that neither the public and neither either country is really prepared to undertake and support.

And so right now, I mean, I think the fragility of that narrative, we’re starting to see sort of come undone in this new phase. But I think it was already, you know, underpinning some of the hollowness of the U.S. effort under the Biden administration to lead and repair the so-called rules-based international order. But you can only get so far when the country is not there.

Absolutely. It’s interesting, but not surprising at all to me, that both of you sort of focus on this absence of an affirmative vision. Neither, no one in the Biden administration was really able to articulate that vision well. And I think that, as you say, it really did leave us quite vulnerable to this faltering confidence, which I think is very much at the heart of what’s in your book, Stronger.

You talk quite a bit about this, and I think that’s absolutely correct. In a lot of your writings, you also talk about this, and we’ll come back to this crisis of American confidence. But speaking of crises of confidence, the other question, of course, I mean, the thing we want to move on to from the Biden years is into the grim reality that we now face.

Trump has been in office for only 10 weeks now, but already his administration has upended American foreign policy in just the way many of us feared, but few of us had actually anticipated, it feels like. His foreign policy record in his first term was, you know, as erratic as that was, looks pretty tame in comparison to what we’ve already seen.

I know that both of you have been asked this. I know I have, too, been asked variations of the same question far too many times just since November, but even before that. But from our current vantage point, and I’ll supply the caveat that we all feel pretty much obliged to offer, which is given that we just can’t know anything that will, you know, about what’s going to emerge from the chaos of this administration or indeed, you know, the chaos of Trump’s own internal thought process, such as it is, is there an outline emerging? Is there a consensus that’s forming?

Is there at least a general direction that is now discernible in Trump’s China policy? And what does a smart analyst look for? What should we be looking for to try to capture the shape of this thing? Let’s start with you, Jessica, but I’d also love Ryan’s take on this.

So first, I think what we can observe from the first 10 weeks or so is that his priority has not been on China and that whatever policy emerges is going to reflect the more fundamental parts of what his administration has placed priority in, which is tariffs, perhaps belief that they are a good thing intrinsically and maybe to be used as leverage.

But I think the signs are that maybe this is actually a tool that is sort of seen as intrinsically useful for their revenue or reshoring of jobs, et cetera. And the other is a sort of a disdain for allies. And I think that that will very much, you know, there may be the president’s own words, there may be efforts to establish a very constructive relationship with China or with Xi Jinping in particular.

But that does not seem to be where the muscles aren’t moving yet in that direction. But they are on these other. I think that the U.S. position is fundamentally going to be informed by, and of course, the Chinese perception of American foreign policy, not to mention the rest of the world’s perception, is going to be, I think, shaped by these kind of dynamics. of fundamental components.

So the Biden administration was very much allies, partners first, and then invest in a line, right, and then compete. I think this administration absolutely is not on board with the line, although American alliances are hopefully somewhat robust. I mean, I think they’re not falling apart that easily. But nonetheless, the whole way in which the United States approaches China, I think, is going to be informed by these fundamental shifts in the way the U.S. views the world through the prism of how Trump seems to approach these two issues.

That said, I think that the emerging contours still have some actions and words on China. Here, I think that it’s still, the jury is out on which of the different potential interests or influences will win out. Maybe Ryan wants to run down the list. Does it help to count the hawks and the doves in his administration? Does Pete Hegseth cancel out Tulsi Gabbard? What is the strategy we can profitably take to figure out what is going to happen?

You talk about muscles he’s exercising. As far as I can tell, his only muscle is the one that flicks on and off the light switch of tariffs. This is a great strategy. Why don’t we just change our strategy every couple of 48 hours? Let’s turn the tariffs on, turn the tariffs off. He’s like my grandnephew when he was a year old; he likes the light switch on and off.

Well, okay, Kaiser, let me try to take a serious step at this. If I close my eyes, turn off my emotions, and finish sort of yelling in a dark room by myself for a little while, we’ve all done that. I think about what President Trump is saying. I think what he’s saying is that there are three big things he wants to do.

The first is he wants to re-industrialize the United States. He believes that we’ve become hollowed out as a country. We’re not building and manufacturing enough. China is manufacturing and building too much. We need to consume less, build more. That’s the first thing I think he’s trying to do, and it doesn’t diverge from what the Biden administration wanted to do. Re-industrialization was a priority for us too.

The second thing I think President Trump wants to do is to regain control of our borders. He believes deeply in sovereignty, in our ability to control what comes in and what comes out of our country. We see this with his emphasis on immigration, also with his emphasis on fentanyl.

The third thing he really wants to do is avoid war. This is somewhat counterintuitive for a guy who beats his chest and tries to play the part of a strong man so much. But if you listen to what he’s saying, he has a deep aversion to the idea of conflict, especially conflict with nuclear powers.

This is an area where I think that Donald Trump and Xi Jinping have something in common, and maybe we can come back to this. But at a macro level, that’s what I think President Trump is trying to do. The next thought is that he doesn’t run a typical government. A typical government has a process between departments and agencies. They convene in the White House Situation Room, develop recommendations, and recommendations move up a ladder until they reach a president for his or her decision. That isn’t how this runs.

This runs like a palace court where he sits in the Oval Office. People shuffle through over the course of the day. He has a series of conversations. Over those conversations, decisions get made, and then things move out. It’s hard to discern what is happening on the basis of what the Department of Defense or the Department of State or anyone else says, because it doesn’t matter as much anymore. What matters is what happens in the orbit of Donald Trump.

That leads to the final thought, and I’ll turn it back to you. I don’t think that Donald Trump has some grand conception of American strategy in a changing world. I think that he has a view of international relations as a very personalized exercise. In that sense, U.S.-Russia relations are his relationship with Vladimir Putin. U.S.-China relations are reflected by his relationship with Xi Jinping.

There may be days when his administration publishes reports or memorandums suggesting that policy will move this way or that. We’ve seen evidence that he doesn’t feel terribly bounded by things his administration does. His administration released a big document talking about investment restrictions in China, and in the next meeting he had in the cabinet room, he basically said he doesn’t care about what they wrote. What matters is what he says, and he wants investment from China into the United States.

We need to pay attention to what he says and what he does because he is ultimately America’s desk officer on China. Until he has an opportunity to sit down with Xi Jinping and sort out the level of ambition, the direction, and the scope of the relationship moving forward, we’re going to be in this murky, ambiguous phase. This is largely because I think he wants to keep space open for the conversation he plans to have with his Chinese counterpart to sort things out and move things forward.

The other big question we constantly get is how does Beijing see all this? What is the view from Beijing? We’re always wondering, how much better prepared, assuming it is better prepared, is it this round? I’m not the first rodeo; the two meetings concluded very recently. We all studied Li Qiang’s speech. We know we saw the utterances, the cryptic utterances of Xi Jinping.

The foreign ministry responded to the announcement of the additional 10% tariffs on Chinese imports in a pretty spicy way. We all talk to people who are quite well placed in China. So let’s try as far as possible to get specific and not just talk in generalities about what we’ve seen. Ryan, again to you, is Beijing readier for Trump 2.0?

I think Beijing is readier for Trump 2.0 than they were in the first instance. They’ve had four years to prepare themselves for this moment, and I think they have a plan in place. Some people suggest that Beijing sees this as a giant opportunity to expand its influence and footprint around the world. Maybe. But my guess, having been around Xi Jinping, is that he would prefer a predictable, steady dynamic rather than an unsteady, unpredictable dynamic.

This is discomforting, at a minimum, for our Chinese counterparts. The big point I would leave you with is that I don’t think the Chinese believe they have a ton of capacity to change the trajectory of things right now. In other words, they don’t think that if they changed the wording of some document or provided some technocratic fix to an economic problem, all their issues will go away with the United States.

They feel this is a structural issue that’s not going to resolve itself anytime soon. In that respect, their view is to make virtue of necessity, to use the pressure that the Trump administration is providing to advance and accelerate their own agenda—whether it be on self-reliance, investments in science and technology, or diversifying trade and investment relationships with others around the world.

They are trying to use the pressure from President Trump to propel their plans forward rather than fight against him on every issue every day. I think we’re talking to the same people in Beijing because that’s very much the read that I’m getting. I wanted to turn over to Jessica; this is something that Ryan talked about that we hear a lot from people who maybe are not talking to the same people.

Beijing is gleeful. Beijing is rubbing its hands in glee at this opportunity. This has just been a gigantic windfall. They can do nothing and win. We’ve all seen that meme of this large lantern-jawed kind of cartoon Xi Jinping sitting there with a grin saying, “Do nothing, win.”

Maybe you’ve seen it; I don’t know. You don’t spend as much time trolling these social media sites as I do. The Trumpian anarchy, the disruptions, the longstanding alliances, the abandonment of security commitments, the de-emphasis or at least the devaluation of American values and ideology. China’s long pined for genuine European strategic autonomy. Now it looks like it’s the chance.

Finbar Birmingham from the South China Morning Post wrote a piece the other day where the lead was something along the lines of Chinese diplomats wandering around European capitals saying, “Your best friend has abandoned you. Let’s rebuild the world order together.” Who knows whether this is true? But again, I tend to see things more like Ryan does, that there isn’t glee in China, that they not only may not have those ambitions, but they don’t have that capacity.

What’s your take on that?

I think, as they would say, the risks and opportunities are entirely entangled, and it’s difficult to separate them. There are certainly aspects of the new administration’s policy that are welcomed, I think, both for quitting the field in certain respects, weakening the transatlantic ties, and dismantling the national endowment for democracy.

All these explicitly attacking and dismantling support for groups that had supported things like China Labor Watch, etc. On the other hand, I think they’re uncomfortable and worried about potential escalation and the need to respond to things like the tariffs that have continued to mount.

We may, in this room, think that what comes out of the State Department doesn’t mean anything because the president ultimately is the decider. But the omission of the U.S. not supporting Taiwan independence from the recent fact sheet has caused quite some consternation in Beijing, as they think about how to respond.

I think that there is, across the board, hope that someday the two leaders will meet, and they may want to preserve space for that. But in the meantime, they’re one, not getting any traction, and two, the blows are coming. There is a need to calibrate this need to be spicy, as you say, showcasing to the Chinese domestic public that the leadership isn’t going to just take one on the cheek, but also not do so much that it provokes further escalation.

This is a really difficult place for them, and I don’t get a sense of overweening confidence, let alone gloating at the moment.

I think it’s really interesting how many people I’ve spoken to are suddenly very eager to remind me of how much China benefited from the international order, of which, as they’ll remind me, it was a responsible stakeholder and a part of. I don’t know if that’s performative, but it seems to signal to me, at least, they’re not going to get too cocky about the moment they’re in, despite everything that has happened.

One of the big problems, and I remember having a conversation with Joe Nye some years ago, we talked about Graham Allison’s Thucydides trap, and he was kind of pooping on it a little bit, even though they’re very good friends, he made that point.

But he said there’s another trap we should be more worried about, the Kindleberger trap. I don’t know how many people have heard of the Kindleberger trap, but Charles Kindleberger was a historian of economics, and he’s regarded as one of the principal architects of the Marshall Plan. His understanding of the grand arc of history was that in moments where an incumbent power is no longer able or willing to provide global public goods, and the rising power doesn’t take up the slack, you get catastrophic results.

The moment he’s talking about is after the end of the Great War in 1918, after Versailles. Britain was unable to have a stable global trading currency, to patrol trade lanes, or provide security public goods in the world. The United States, rather than stepping up, passed bugger thy neighbor tariffs in the Smoot-Hawley Act and basically went turtle.

The result, according to Kindleberger and Nye, was the rise of fascism, the Second War, the Shoah. Is China right now willing and able to take up the slack? Are we going to keep sneering and jeering at the Belt and Road Initiative? Are we going to cheer when it stumbles? Or are we going to recognize that maybe this is the way out of the Kindleberger trap?

Well, look, I think that China, for a long time, has recognized that they face what they call three traps: the Thucydides trap, the Kindleberger trap, and the middle-income trap. Of those three traps, I think we can eliminate one. I’ll associate myself with Joe Nye on this; the Thucydides trap is not going to provide a guide to the future of the U.S.-China relationship.

That leaves the Kindleberger trap and the middle-income trap in front of the Chinese. The Chinese have a real problem here because the United States has been the supplier of public goods for the international system for over 70 years, and now, suddenly, the United States is withdrawing from that role.

I don’t think China is prepared; I don’t think they’re capable of filling a vacuum that might emerge. I think they will try to find partners to work with to close some of these gaps, whether that’s with the Europeans, who are very good at rulemaking, or through the BRICS organization as a vehicle to try to close some of these gaps.

But this is a real challenge that the Chinese must contend with in the coming years.

Jessica, one of the more conspicuous shifts has been in the U.S. posture toward Ukraine and Russia. In view of Trump’s quite sudden volte-face, how is China adjusting its approach to the war itself? I quoted Finbar Birmingham: “Your best friend has abandoned you. Let’s uphold the multilateral order together.” To what effect so far? Is anyone buying what China is selling this way?

I do think that you’re seeing signs of a thaw in European attitudes toward China out of necessity, not that their position has changed and concern about China’s support for Russia. But now that the United States is making common cause with Russia against Ukraine, I think they’re realizing they need to be a little bit more diversified.

But I think that the bigger source of uncertainty really is China’s relationship with Russia. I think there is concern in Beijing, although there have been efforts by both sides to reassure one another that that relationship isn’t going anywhere. But that also is an important dynamic to watch.

One of the more interesting ideas coming from people like Marco Rubio and others in the Trump orbit is the reverse Nixon, or is it the reverse Kissinger? That’s a matter of debate, whereby the United States will somehow peel China off of Russia. How does that idea strike you, Ryan?

I say good luck. If I could just comment briefly on the transatlantic relationship and then on this, I think that credit where credit’s due. Wang Yi went to Munich; I was in Munich for the Munich Security Conference two weeks ago, and he delivered an effective speech.

His address to the European audience had three big messages. The first was that the world is moving to multipolarity, and we, China, recognize Europe as a pole. The next big message was that China will be a force for stability in a very unstable time, which was a refreshing affirmation. The third message Wang Yi emphasized was that Europe deserves a seat at the table for any resolution of conflict in Ukraine.

In this way, he was really able to present a contrast with the presentation the vice president had made just before him. So credit where credit’s due. I also recognize that the situation is completely different than it was 45 days ago. The United States and Europe no longer view each other as having shared values.

Europe looks at the United States as an economic adversary, as an unreliable security partner. The situation is just different. We are in a new world today than we were before, and I’m not sure that it can be built back or put together, at least in any short period of time.

All that said, I’m skeptical that China will be able to profit off of this moment in Europe. As long as the Russia-Ukraine conflict goes on, Europeans are very convinced that China is an enabler of that conflict and is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

As industries in Europe become hollowed out, particularly in Germany, it will be difficult for China to make inroads unless there are structural adjustments to the economic relationship. So let’s watch this space, but I would be hesitant to conclude that China will profit from the rupturing of transatlantic relations.

On the idea of a reverse Kissinger, I say good luck because I don’t think it’s realistic. This effort by people like Marco Rubio and others who feel uncomfortable with Donald Trump moving close to Vladimir Putin are looking for a way post facto to rationalize and justify and put some intellectual grandeur around what is really sort of a crude adjustment on the part of President Trump.

When Kissinger went to China, China and the Soviet Union had already split many years prior. We walked into a split. There is no split today between China and Russia, so that analogy doesn’t hold. I would also add that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping think in longer time horizons than three and a half years, and as much as it may be satisfying for them to have the sunshine on their face with Donald Trump for three and a half years, they can’t have certainty about what will happen after him.

It would be asking a lot of either of those leaders to abandon their relationship for a short-duration benefit that may be reversible.

Jessica, we were chatting earlier today, and one of the problems that I feel very deeply is that while we probably both object to a lot of the things that have happened with the Trump administration, withdrawing from the World Health Organization, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement on day one, as it promised to do, we’re not surprised by any of this.

But it seems like even reasonable people keep framing this and arguing against these moves—the dismantlement of USAID comes to mind—in terms of ceding victories to China, rather than just sort of on their own merits. How do you see this?

I very much agree that this is a poor way to frame it, in part because on the merits, analytically, I don’t see China being there, stepping out and ready to provide the public goods that were previously provided. They’re not filling the void.

Of course, they’re going to continue to do the things that they were doing already. Once you remove American presence and largesse, the field changes a bit. But I don’t think it’s necessarily a win. Secondly, this framing continues to fail to answer the question: What is the benefit for Americans at home of America continuing to invest in infectious disease surveillance, conflict prevention, stabilization?

What are the spillover consequences of problems beyond our borders to Americans inside? Until you’ve answered that question, I don’t think the argument about losing the competition to China is going to resonate.

That’s in part what we saw. Donald Trump didn’t campaign on competing or out-competing China in the way the Biden administration has framed it. That wasn’t the argument. I think that the effort to fight for them on the basis of, “This is a gift to China,” is going to be ineffective and analytically off the mark.

A lot of this is sort of: The arsonist has burned down our library. Now the other guy has more books than us. That’s a real problem.

Let’s move to the Western Pacific here. Jessica, we’ve talked about how the Biden administration at least understood the importance of alliances, even if we might not all agree on how the administration leveraged those alliances in the region.

Let’s talk about how the Trump administration’s approach has raised serious concerns among our traditional allies in the region: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand. We’ve just seen Chinese naval vessels conducting live-fire exercises in the waters between Australia and New Zealand in the Australian EEZ.

What is the sense in the region? How are various countries among these U.S. allies, but also in ASEAN states who are not formally allied, navigating this very uncertain time that’s been brought about by these Trumpian policies?

Great question. I think there are a lot of different facets to this. On the one hand, there’s sort of a relief that this is no longer the United States trying to divide the world into democracies versus autocracies, which never went very far in Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, there is real concern among U.S. allies that they are going to be extorted or abandoned. So there’s a lot of effort to make nice with and appease and affirm the relationship with the new administration. But I would say that there’s also no kind of homogeneous response.

In some of these countries, there are quite a number of fans of Trump. There are pro-America, pro-Trump contingents that are now really giving voice to those sentiments. So it’s a mixed bag, and I think we’ll have to see how this evolves.

I do think the concerns about the American security guarantees might have troubling consequences for proliferation.

But it’s early days yet. Understandably. I would love to put that question to you, but in the interest of time, let’s move on to talk about Taiwan, something you work on really extensively.

Ryan, you had a recent great Twitter thread about Taiwan’s reaction to Trump’s shift on Ukraine. From the very beginning, people have been drawing parallels to Taiwan. How is Taipei actually interpreting this, as well as Trump’s threat to tariff goods, especially semiconductors from Taiwan? What does it tell us maybe about how allies more broadly are recalibrating their expectations of Washington, but more specifically about Taipei itself?

Well, thank you, Kaiser. I’ve had a lot of interaction with friends in Taipei in recent weeks, and they’re pretty jarred by what’s happened and for reasons that I understand and that I empathize with. I mean, we have, in recent weeks, sort of turned on our head a longstanding policy as it relates to Ukraine. We are sort of turning our back on a friend under fire. We’re showing ambivalence about standing up for a fellow democracy. And so all of these things have parallels that resonate very deeply with our friends in Taipei who are worried about something happening to them as well.

But here’s what I try to tell my friends that will listen, which is that the analogy is imperfect, and it shouldn’t be taken too far between Ukraine and Taiwan. And there are a few reasons for that. The first of which is that geography is very different. Ukraine has a land border with Russia. There’s a lower barrier to entry, so to speak, than there would be in the case of a hundred-mile moat between China and Taiwan.

The second difference is simply that the United States has a law on the books, the Taiwan Relations Act, which compels us to maintain certain capabilities and puts Taiwan in a very unique category of partners around the world. And then the third difference, which is really sort of the most foundational and fundamental difference in this current moment, is that the United States can’t achieve its goals without Taiwan any more than Taiwan can achieve its security without the United States. Whether we like it or not, we both depend upon each other.

The United States, President Trump’s goal is to reindustrialize the United States. It doesn’t happen without chips that are produced in Taiwan. Ninety percent of the world’s most advanced chips come from Taiwan, and there is just no alternative to getting to where we want to go unless we have a productive, profitable partnership with Taiwan.

And if none of those things are persuasive to my friends in Taiwan, the final thing that I offer to them is that I think that President Trump recognizes that the Nobel Peace Prize is not going to be won in the Taiwan Strait. And so I think that he is going to be searching for victories and breakthroughs in other areas than Taiwan. Ultimately, this may all be sort of shallow comfort for our friends in Taiwan, but I think it’s something. And I would encourage us not to get too fatalistic about the situation because ultimately, it’s important for the people of Taiwan to have confidence in their own future, to believe that they have agency in their own future. And I believe that they do and that they should continue to maintain that conviction.

It’s impossible to talk about the U.S. shadow relationship without talking about technology and technology competition. So before we wrap up, I definitely want to hit this topic. You know, people have drawn very, very different lessons from what we’ve seen with the release of DeepSeq R1 in January, which really kind of landed like a thunderclap on the ears, especially just south of here, where we are right now. You know, some have proclaimed that efforts to starve China of key technology imports have simply failed, that this is the proof, right? That all we’ve done is lit a fire to Chinese ingenuity, that they’ve redoubled their efforts. And look, look what they’ve already done in such a short time.

Other people say we need to double down, that we just need to build out a bigger yard and a higher fence, right? So I guess I’m curious what you expect the Trump administration to do. Which tack do you think they’re going to take, if either or something entirely unexpected? Jessica, why don’t you start? I mean, if I had to guess, I think that they would lean in the direction of expanding the yard, making that fence higher, closing the loopholes.

But I think that there’s really a need for greater thinking around the efficacy of an export control centric strategy with the end goal defined as maintaining a larger lead over China as possible. That’s language that Jake Sullivan used. I think J.D. Vance has something that’s his own version. But nonetheless, it has a lot of echoes of that. And, you know, I would recommend a recent conversation that I think that we held at SAIS on the evolution of AI and in particular what it means to be in the lead and how far behind we really can keep China, given DeepSeq as well as the evolution of technology and its use cases.

Because if we can’t really maintain a very large lead through export controls, even if they have been somewhat effective to date and that the whole board on which we are playing looks a little different, then we need a different strategy. I don’t know, and I don’t know that holding China back and running faster ourselves can really ever be significant enough to mitigate the potential dangers, whatever they may turn out to be.

And there’s a lot of speculation as to how soon we might get to artificial general intelligence versus, regardless of whether we get there or not, what would it mean to have, you know, like 100,000 really smart engineers in the cloud. And I think that strategically prioritizing that at the expense of the rest, I think is a real mistake.

Ryan, Secretary, Foreign Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo on her way out did an interview where she famously said that trying to stop Chinese innovation was a fool’s errand. She, by the way, Commerce oversees the very department, BIS, that was tasked with actually executing on. Do you think that we’re going to see change? Do you think that the Trump administration will abandon this and will knuckle under pressure that they’re getting from a lot of the major semiconductor manufacturers from Intel, from NVIDIA, and from abroad as well, from ASML, to lay off? Or do you think they’re going to build a higher wall and a bigger yard?

Well, it’s a good question. And if I had to, you know, if someone forced me to make a bet, I would bet on what Jessica just said, that I think the natural instinct is going to be to try to build a higher fence and a bigger yard. That’s the instinct that is going to occur amongst President Trump’s staff who want to limit China’s advancements in technological innovation and accelerate our own. It’s unclear whether that’s the instinct that President Trump himself is going to have.

And ultimately, his views are what’s going to matter. And so I would just encourage us to have a bit of humility in forecasting this because as I listen to President Trump, what I hear him say is that he wants to expand American exports. He wants to accelerate American reindustrialization. He wants to grow the American economy. And his theory of the case for doing so is to strengthen tariffs, to deregulate, and to lower energy costs. That’s his theory. Technology is not part of that theory for him.

And so it may be that his team sort of moves forward along the pathway that President Biden and his team have established. But I don’t think the demand signal will emanate from the Oval Office. You know, he wants to advance American advantage and to reindustrialize. And he’s recently done a press conference with TSMC and sort of shown off how they’ve got. But there seems to be a wholesale abandonment of industrial policies that were only just really getting started, showing actually some progress. I’m talking not just about the Inflation Reduction Act, but also about the Chips and Science Act, both passed during the Biden administration with pretty strong bipartisan support.

Meanwhile, what we’re seeing in China, if you’ve followed what’s come out of the two meetings, the NDRC just today announced this massive new trillion yuan national VC fund that they say will be all about slow capital that will be for deployment in some of the most bleeding-edge technologies, biomanufacturing, 6G. What, you know, what’s with this? I mean, maybe Jessica, you can start with this abandonment of industrial policy. Is that, am I reading that right? Does that look like where we’re going?

I mean, I think Ryan’s right to caution us against reading too much clarity here yet. I mean, I do, you know, the CHIPS Act is, I mean, sorry, the folks in charge of implementing that are being, that office is being dismantled. So, yeah, I think there is emerging a sense of opposition to public sector investment. There is a lot of interest in private technology companies doing a lot to drive the future of innovation. But I don’t know what that looks like in terms of, I wouldn’t necessarily call that, well, is that industrial policy? I guess it depends. I mean, is it capture? I’m not sure.

But it looks different than it did under the Biden administration, which moved in that direction but was wanting to be very careful about not being seen as necessarily picking winners, or at least not too quickly and doing it in the, unfortunately, pretty slow way. But because of some of these concerns, but that’s, that’s what I can see so far. I do want to make sure to leave some time for questions.

And so I’m going to try to sort of combine some of these last few that I had. And I did say we come back to this idea of an affirmative vision about American domestic politics. And maybe this is a good note to end on before we get to recommendations. Of course, we need to do recommendations. So what should that look like? I mean, what is possible in this administration? Or maybe we should start thinking forward to what that would look like on the other side of this apocalyptic chasm that we’re now stumbling into.

An affirmative vision for U.S.-China policy. What is the Ryan Haas version? What is the Jessica Chenwise version? Well, I’ll get us started, but I’ll quickly pass the baton to Jessica. And I want to hear what you say on this, too, Kaiser. But look, I think that we need to accept that the United States and China are going to be the two leading powers in the world for the rest of the century. And that if the competition is done right, it can push us both to improve and enhance our performance. And that’s what we should aim for.

Ultimately, the purpose of government is to provide for the safety, the prosperity, and the health of the American people. That’s what it’s all about. And so the question then becomes, what type of relationship with China best enables us to do that? And I don’t think that that’s where the conversation is going to be on an affirmative basis in the coming short period of time. But that doesn’t mean that we need to stop thinking about and refining our thinking on it. Because there will become a moment in the future where the window will open again. And we better damn well have a good answer when it does.

Yeah. Jessica? Well, I guess I would say that maybe the aperture is there already in the sense that there’s been a shift, I think, in the rhetoric on both sides of the aisle that we are now in a kind of post-American unipolar moment. We’re now in a multipolar world where we are one of the most important countries in the world. But it definitely remains to be seen what does it mean to advance American interests in that kind of a world where we aren’t trying to shepherd the entire globe, perhaps in ways that aren’t commensurate with our capacity, our domestic political capacity, just to support that role that we play for so long.

So I think the question is then what are the outcomes, both internationally as well as in our bilateral relationship with China, that benefit Americans, that allow parents today to think that their children are going to have not a worse life than they, but a better one. Right. And so I think it’s still unchanged that the affirmative vision is one in which we define success not by outcompeting China, but by doing well by ourselves, regardless of how well China or badly China does. Right. And that doesn’t mean that we live entirely separate fates. Obviously, there are a lot of issues that beset both countries to differing degrees.

And so where there are shared interests, let’s work together, but let’s not define things entirely in relative terms. Right. Ryan, you wanted to add something? Yeah. I think it also, in thinking through this question, it’s important to think about what’s on the minds of the American people because ultimately they’re the ones who decide the direction of our country. Or so we used to think. You know, China is an issue that consumes us in the policy world, not as much in the public. And it doesn’t drive a lot of votes. It doesn’t change a lot of electoral outcomes.

And so we ought to focus on getting the policy right. The one thing that the American people are overwhelmingly supportive of is working to avoid conflict with China. And I feel this everywhere I travel around the country and talk with audiences. The question that I receive most often, most consistently, is are my children going to have to go to war with China? And that’s the starting point, I think, for any productive, serious vision, affirmative vision, and narrative for the future of the relationship.

And what it tells me is that we ought to be really concentrating our efforts and thinking deeply about how we can work to reduce the risk of conflict with China. That’s what the American people want those of us who work around the policy space to be working on. And the more that we’re able to concentrate and focus our attention and our energy around those issues, whether it’s on nuclear issues, AI, space, cyber, et cetera, the more that that will sort of concentrate the relationship in areas where there is mutual benefit to making progress, which I think will, over time, be net beneficial.

I know, Ryan, you asked me to weigh in myself, but I’m afraid we’re out of time. I will try this. I actually think that before we can get to a point where we can, as a nation, have an affirmative vision, we need to do a lot of self-examination about what it is that causes such profound psychological discomfiture at China’s rise itself. We need to really do this self-criticism session. We need to write a thorough self-criticism.

I mean, a lot of it, I honestly think that there’s something that sticks in our craw and we’re not able to talk about that comfortably. Whether that is just simply this reflexive impulse to demand global hegemony and primacy, I think it has to do with a lot of things. I think it has to do with these pillars of American exceptionalism that, one by one, China has sort of knocked over our beliefs about the way that market economics is supposed to interact with politics, that technology innovation is supposed to interact with economics or with politics, all these things where, you know, time and again, China seems to defy these axiomatic beliefs of ours.

And that hurts. It causes us some psychological distress, and we’re not really wrestling with that as a nation enough. I think this is only going to be, you know, it’s going to be drawn even further forward. So, yeah, I want there to be an affirmative vision, but I think it needs to be predicated on us having first gone through this painful introspection and figured out what it is that bothers us so much. Is it race? Is it, you know, is it the sort of replacement theory for you writ large that, you know, we, like the white man in America, sees this nation approaching a moment where we will be, it will be a majority-minority country? Is it that? Does America feel that, and is that the source of psychological pain?

So, that’s where I am, but I want to, first of all, thank you both so much for flying all the way out here from the other coast. Let’s give it up for Ryan Haas and Jessica Chenwise. Fifteen years ago when I started this podcast, we started this new tradition called recommendations, and this year I’ve added a new thing to it. So, not only do I ask my guests to make a recommendation, I have a little new segment called Paying It Forward, where I ask them each to simply name check somebody, a younger colleague, or somebody who’s in our area, whose work just is deserving of attention that they’re not getting it.

I mean, they can be, you know, a colleague of yours or somebody in another institution, in academia, in a think tank, anything at all. So, Ryan, why don’t you go first, and then Jessica, and then after yours, you can go with your recommendation. So, Paying It Forward. I would like to identify two of my colleagues at Brookings who work on China work, who I would encourage everyone to follow and track their thinking on. The first is Patty Kim, Patricia Kim, who has a book that will be coming out soon on Chinese foreign policy. It’s going to be great. It’s going to be a really original contribution to the field. You’re here. She’s great, yeah. The second is John Zinn, who recently joined us at Brookings. He focuses on Chinese elite politics and has a lot of fresh insights and original ideas that I think would… I just read his piece on the two meetings. It was really good. Very good, very good.

All right. And then, Jessica, and then after that, your recommendation. So, I’d like to recommend the work of Jeffrey Ding. He was recently on this AI panel that we hosted but is doing really, really important work around, again, what does it mean to lead in this space, focusing more on diffusion rather than being at the frontier. That’s what will ultimately contribute. As well as the work of my colleague, Jonas Nam, super thoughtful, just came back from the White House Council on Economic Advisors, works on China, industrial policy, both in China and in the United States. I didn’t catch the name? Jonas Nam. Oh, yeah, Jonas. Yeah, of course, who does environmental work, right. Absolutely. He’s, yeah, he’s fantastic. Yes. Great.

All right. You’re up for your recommendation first. So, my recommendation, first, I have to say, I think that, you know, although, you know, self-examination or self-criticism is all well and good, I think that we’re not going to get very far there, Kaiser, frankly. I think one of the other challenges is actually our assessment of China and what I think of as a little bit too much excessive certainty about, you know, what China is up to and where it’s headed. And so, you know, one of the values that this new institute that we’ve stood up at SAIS imbues is the idea of rigor, but also humility. Humility.

And so, my recommendation, actually, as I was flying out here on the plane, I watched the movie Conclave, which, you know, whatever you think of the movie, there was this great moment, and I won’t spoil much of the movie for you all, but was the speech around certainty being, you know, the enemy of tolerance. And frankly, that we need more, I think, humility or doubt in some of the assumptions that we make. Maybe it’s easy to look at our own government and have a little bit of humility about where exactly is it going. Well, it’s not that dissimilar in China. There’s a lot of, it’s kind of a hot mess over there too.

I’ve read like six or seven Robert Harris novels recently. Conclave is probably the last one. No, there’s one other that I haven’t read recently, but I will get to Conclave. If I have it, actually, I have the audio book, and so I was saving it for my flight over to China. And, you know, with Pope Francis now ailing, maybe it may take on a kind of, well, let’s not jinx anything here.

All right, Ryan, your recommendation. Well, first of all, Jessica, I’m happy that you didn’t spoil the ending because I’m planning on watching that with my wife when I get home. But the two recommendations I have, the first is a piece by Derek Thompson in The Atlantic in the last edition, the anti-social century, that talked about the way that social media and technology is changing the nature of our relationships. As a father of four kids myself, it really sort of resonated, the importance of having human connection going forward.

And then to try to be a little bit more professional at Kaiser, I would just add a book called The Ambassadors by Robert Cooper, which is a book that takes chapters to look at the foreign policy thinkers who had the greatest impact in their moment. And the common thread throughout this book, which traces back to Machiavelli all the way through Cannon, Kissinger, and others, is that a lot of these people who really changed their environment, their views were out of fashion for much of their career. But they developed it steadily, steadily, steadily. And when the moment was right, they changed the world. And so I just offer that to encourage all of us to continue to develop our thinking and not feel the need to hug a trend whichever direction the wind blows.

Fantastic recommendation. And really good sage advice from a father of four. My turn. My recommendation. So I have this strange fixation now with sort of pre-war German and Austrian writers, people writing in Germany. I’ve read quite a bit. I mean, Stefan Zweig. I read novels by him and his memoir. I’ve read Thomas Mann. I’ve read a lot of German stuff recently from the late 19th and early 20th century. Recently, I started Robert Musil’s book, The Man Without Qualities. It’s fantastic. It’s an unfinished novel that he wrote basically between about 1930 and 1946. So it took him a while and still never quite finished it.

And even in this form, it’s incredibly long. I think the print edition, which I do not have, I’m listening to it on Audible, it’s over 1,000 pages. It’s 60-odd hours. When I buy audiobooks, in my family, we have a Chinese motto that we live by. It’s, you know, and, you know, we go for, I like long, I mean, I want to get my money’s worth. If it’s like eight hours, nah, I’m not going to, I can just read that. I want a nice, long, long, meaty book. And so this thing is 60 hours long. And so I’m into it. It’s just fantastic.

It’s a novel of ideas. And it is just the subtlety. It’s just such sublime psychological exploration. Not for everyone. It’s very deeply philosophical, very dramatic. You know, and it takes place in the year 1913. A lot of sort of contemporaneous subplots that intertwine in odd ways. Just fantastic. A man without, the man without qualities is Robert Musil. So that’s my recommendation. And with that, once again, thank you so much, Ryan and Jessica, for coming all the way out here to my alma mater, to UC Berkeley. Go Bears! Thank you, everyone.

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This is an experimental rewrite.

Welcome to this special live edition of the Sinica Podcast, coming to you from the University of California, Berkeley. Hello, Berkeley! I’d like to extend my gratitude to Sophie Volpin, Xiaojie Ma, and, of course, Rachel Stern, who just introduced us from the Center for Chinese Studies at the Institute for Asian Studies here at Cal for making this happen.

What a delight it is to be back at my alma mater—a place where, even knowing everything I now know about higher education, I would enroll here again without hesitation. However, I realize now that I would never get in. Anyway, Cal absolutely shaped me into the person I am today. My four years here were truly some of the best and most unforgettable years of my life, where I formed friendships that have lasted to this day.

My best friend from freshman year in the dorm lived in Black Hall, room 107, unit three. Yeah, we’re still friends today! I ate way too many blondies and Top Dog while I was here, and I definitely plan to indulge in some Top Dog while I’m back. As you know, this program dives into books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that help us better understand what’s happening in China’s politics, foreign relations, economics, and society.

Join me each week for in-depth conversations that bring more clarity and less heat to how we think and talk about China. Sinica is supported this year by the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a national resource center for studying East Asia. The podcast will remain free; it has always been free and will continue to be free.

However, if you truly value the work I do, and if your organization believes in this podcast, please consider lending your support—just like Cal Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin-Madison have. You can reach me at [email protected]. I love hearing from you, so feel free to email me!

If I had to choose just two people I would trust with the stewardship of American policy toward China, people who truly understand the challenges China presents—and those it doesn’t—one of whom possesses both intellect and temperament, it would be Jessica Chen-Weiss and Ryan Haas.

You can imagine how thrilled I am to have them both here in Berkeley to discuss the future of the U.S.-China relationship, especially in light of the dramatic developments we’ve already witnessed. It’s really no exaggeration to say that in the few short months we’ve been planning this event, the world has undergone changes unseen in a century.

Let me briefly introduce our two guests, and then we will jump right in to discuss the recent past—specifically the Biden administration—which, while it feels like a decade ago, was just a few years back. We’ll also touch on the present and possible scenarios for the future.

Jessica Chen-Weiss is the David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. She is the inaugural faculty director of SAIS’s Institute for America, China, and the Future of Global Affairs. You should definitely check out her sessions on the Sinica podcast. We have another episode dropping later this week on the fabulous session she led, called “Getting China Right,” and it’s the first of many more to come.

You may have heard her on podcasts like The Ezra Klein Show and even Jon Stewart. She has also published extensively in outlets like Foreign Affairs, where she has emerged as a compelling voice in the discourse on U.S.-China relations. So, Jessica, welcome back to Sinica. It’s wonderful to have you!

Jessica: Wonderful to be here! Thanks so much, Kaiser.

Kaiser: Also joining us again—what is it, for the fourth time now?—is Ryan Haas. Ryan is the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and serves as the Chintu and Cecilia Yenku Chair in Taiwan Studies there.

Ryan served as the China director on the National Security Council during President Obama’s second term from 2013 to 2017 and has had many years of experience as a Foreign Service officer in China and other places. I just learned from our conversation in the green room that he took the Foreign Service exam at the age of 22 while hungover. You’re not hungover today, right?

Ryan: Nope, definitely not hungover today!

Kaiser: That’s important to note! Ryan has published extensively in outlets like Foreign Affairs, probably while in a state of perfect sobriety, and regularly contributes to the Brookings website. Ryan, a very warm welcome to you, and my apologies for that little anecdote—I just couldn’t resist!

Ryan: Thank you, Kaiser! It’s great to be back with you, and I appreciate you having me on the show. And yes, for my parents listening, I am completely sober today!

Kaiser: Alright, Ryan, let’s start with you. In hindsight, how should we evaluate the Biden administration’s approach to China over the last four years? You wrote a terrific and candid piece detailing what worked, what didn’t, and where some fundamental flaws were.

You might recall that I had a conversation with the late, great Jeff Bader, who I’m sure you knew well during your time in the administration. He wrote a not-so-flattering piece critiquing the Biden administration’s approach. What were your thoughts on that, and could you summarize your arguments and what, if anything, you might have advised the administration to do differently?

Ryan: Thank you, Kaiser. The piece was actually dedicated to Jeff Bader, who was a mentor to me and many others in this room. My main argument was that, objectively, the Biden administration performed well in several areas. By the time they left office, alliances were stronger, and its position in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere had improved. Also, the American economy was in a relatively strong position compared to when they took office.

However, I do think they fell short in a few key areas. My two main critiques are: first, they prioritized politics over policy and strategy. Whenever faced with a choice between what was politically advantageous and what was strategically sound, they tended to err on the side of politics.

My second critique relates to their narrative. Promoting the idea of a steady state of managed competition isn’t particularly inspiring. It doesn’t rally people to rise above and work toward the common good. They missed an opportunity to articulate why Americans should care about our competition with China, highlighting the benefits we could achieve. Without an affirmative vision, the narrative became filled with grievances and made Americans feel vulnerable and insecure. When that happens, it appears that our leaders lack strength, creating a cycle that leads us right back to a dynamic where politics impacts policy.

Kaiser: That’s a very solid critique, and I wholeheartedly agree. Jessica, you were actually part of the State Department in policy planning under Secretary Blinken during the Biden administration when many crucial decisions were made. I know you’ve been critical of some of the team’s policies toward China, but like Ryan, you also believe some things were done right. Could you share your perspective on both the good and the bad? Do you think missteps stemmed from incorrect assumptions about the China challenge, or were they due to limitations posed by domestic politics?

Jessica: There’s a lot to unpack here, and I largely agree with Ryan’s diagnosis. One thing the Biden administration did right was to attempt to restore American standing and leadership in the world and rebuild trust with allies and partners. However, they were somewhat constrained by the political environment, which made it challenging to act decisively. They spent a lot of time focused on rebuilding what Secretary Blinken referred to as a “position of strength,” which didn’t resonate well with China—leading them to feel that they must remain subordinate.

In the latter half of the Biden administration, a greater emphasis was put on stabilizing what had become a rapid descent into potential conflict. But while we should acknowledge efforts aimed at resuming communication channels, I don’t think they allowed themselves enough time to really institutionalize that communication—to demonstrate wins that showed a stable relationship could benefit Americans.

They left a vacuum filled by grievances, so we’ll see how diplomacy evolves in the new administration. It’s still early, but I think the absence of substantial wins to showcase the value of diplomacy during the latter half of the Biden administration made it easy for that approach to be undone.

To Ryan’s point, I think the narrative really did shift only slightly from what the Trump administration established during its tenure—defining this as a strategic competition for world dominance. But this creates a zero-sum dynamic that makes it difficult for either country to envision a path forward, as neither appears ready for that sort of approach. Also, the narrative underlying the U.S. effort to lead and restore the so-called rules-based international order started to show its fragility, especially given the lack of public support behind it.

Kaiser: It’s interesting, and not surprising at all, that both of you focus on the absence of a clear vision. No one in the Biden administration effectively articulated that vision, and I think it left us vulnerable regarding our lack of confidence, a theme that’s central to your book, Stronger.

You address this crisis of American confidence extensively, and I think both of you have highlighted it accurately. Now, speaking of confidence, let’s transition a bit. Trump has only been in office for about 10 weeks now, but his administration has already disrupted American foreign policy in ways many feared, though few anticipated.

I know both of you have been asked variations of this question far too frequently since November, but from our current vantage point—keeping in mind that we can’t accurately predict what will emerge from the chaos of this administration—do you see any emerging outlines or consensus forming regarding Trump’s China policy? What should smart analysts be looking for to understand its direction? Jessica, let’s start with you, and I’d love to hear Ryan’s take as well.

Jessica: First, from what we can see in the first ten weeks, it appears that the administration isn’t prioritizing China. Any policy that emerges will likely reflect their core values around tariffs, perhaps viewing them as beneficial leverage. It seems likely that this administration may see tariffs as an intrinsic tool for revenue or job reshoring.

Additionally, there’s a distinct disdain for allies present, which might influence their engagement with China. While there may be efforts to cultivate a constructive relationship with Xi Jinping, it doesn’t seem like the administration is currently moving in that direction. Their stance on tariffs seems indicative of the broader approach to international relations, which contrasts sharply with how the Biden administration prioritized allies first, placed a great emphasis on investing in alliances before engaging in competition.

I think the way the U.S. approaches China will be informed by fundamental shifts in how this administration perceives global dynamics.

Ryan: To add to that, I think the early signs show there are three significant goals that President Trump appears to prioritize. First, he wants to re-industrialize the United States, feeling that we’ve become too hollowed out. The second goal seems to involve regaining control of our borders and asserting sovereignty over what enters or leaves our country, as evidenced by his focus on immigration and his policies around fentanyl.

So, while it’s still early, it seems clear that the administration will have its own distinct approach that diverges from its predecessor. Ryan: The third thing Trump really wants to do is avoid war. This is somewhat counterintuitive for someone who often tries to portray himself as a strongman. However, if you listen carefully to what he’s saying, you can sense that he has a deep aversion to the idea of conflict—especially with nuclear powers.

I think this is an area where he and Xi Jinping may have something in common, and we can revisit that later. But on a macro level, that’s the main thing I believe President Trump is focusing on.

Now, the next point is that he doesn’t operate like a typical government. In a conventional government, there’s a process involving different departments and agencies. They convene in the White House Situation Room to develop recommendations, and these recommendations climb up the ladder before they reach a president for a decision. That’s not how it works in Trump’s administration.

It operates more like a palace court, where he sits in the Oval Office and people flow in and out throughout the day. Over those casual conversations, decisions get made, and then actions are taken. It’s challenging to discern what’s happening based on what the Department of Defense, State Department, or any other agency says. Instead, what matters is what occurs in Trump’s orbit.

This brings me to my final thought before handing it back to you. I don’t believe Donald Trump has a grand vision for American strategy in a changing world. His view of international relations appears to be quite personalized. For instance, U.S.-Russia relations are reflected in his relationship with Vladimir Putin, while U.S.-China relations mirror his interactions with Xi Jinping.

There may be days when reports or memos are published that suggest a certain policy direction. But evidence shows he often feels unconstrained by what his administration proposes. For example, his administration released a significant document detailing investment restrictions in China, yet during the next cabinet meeting, he casually dismissed it, emphasizing that what counts is what he personally says. He clearly wants investments from China into the United States.

We need to pay close attention to his statements and actions because he ultimately acts as America’s desk officer on China. Until he has an opportunity to sit down with Xi Jinping to clarify their ambitions, direction, and scope of the relationship moving forward, we will remain in a murky, ambiguous phase. This is largely because he seems intent on keeping options open for that anticipated conversation with his Chinese counterpart to sort things out.

Kaiser: How does Beijing view all this? What’s the perspective from there? There’s always curiosity about how prepared they are for this new phase. Ryan, do you think Beijing is ready for “Trump 2.0”?

Ryan: I believe Beijing is more prepared for Trump 2.0 than they were previously. They’ve had four years to strategize for this moment, and it seems they have a plan in place. Some say that Beijing views this as a chance to expand its influence globally. While that might be true, knowing Xi Jinping, I suspect he would prefer a predictable and steady dynamic rather than an unpredictable one.

This uncertainty is likely disconcerting for our Chinese counterparts. However, one key takeaway is that the Chinese don’t think they have a lot of capacity to change the current trajectory. In other words, they realize that simply altering some document’s wording or providing a technocratic fix won’t resolve their issues with the United States.

They perceive this as a structural problem that won’t resolve itself easily. Thus, their strategy seems to be making virtue out of necessity. They intend to use the pressure from Trump’s administration to accelerate their own agenda—whether that involves self-reliance, investments in technology, or diversifying trade relations globally.

Rather than fighting back against Trump on every issue daily, they seem to be leveraging the pressure to propel their plans forward. That’s certainly the insight I’ve been getting from conversations with those in Beijing.

Kaiser: Jessica, Ryan mentioned a perspective he’s hearing around Beijing. Some voices suggest that Beijing is actually quite pleased with this situation, seeing it as a substantial opportunity. How do you perceive this?

Jessica: I think the risks and opportunities for China are indeed interwoven, making them hard to untangle. While some elements of the new administration’s policy may be welcomed—such as lessening the field by weakening transatlantic ties and dismantling democracy support mechanisms—they are also concerned about potential escalation.

We might think the State Department’s output doesn’t carry weight since the president ultimately calls the shots. However, the omission of U.S. support for Taiwan independence from the recent fact sheet has caused considerable unease in Beijing, making them deliberate on how to respond.

They are optimistic about the possibility of a future meeting between the two leaders, hoping to preserve diplomatic space for that potential encounter. Yet, in the meantime, they find themselves both under pressure and not gaining much traction. This situation necessitates a careful balance of demonstrating to their domestic audience that their leadership won’t just take hits while also not provoking further escalation.

In this complex scenario, I detect a lack of overall confidence from their leaders, rather than any gleeful celebration of this moment.

Ryan: It’s fascinating how many people I’ve spoken with want to remind me of how much China benefitted from the international order, emphasizing their role as a responsible stakeholder. I’m not sure if that’s merely performative or a sign that they’re not getting too overconfident.

There’s another issue we need to consider, which I discussed with Joe Nye years ago. We talked about Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap, a concept he found somewhat exaggerated. Instead, he highlighted an alternative concern—the Kindleberger Trap.

Kaiser: What’s the Kindleberger Trap?

Ryan: It refers to moments when an incumbent power can no longer provide global public goods, and the rising power fails to step in. The historical context is post-World War I: Britain could no longer stabilize global trade, and the U.S. responded with isolationism through tariffs like the Smoot-Hawley Act.

According to Kindleberger and Nye, this vacuum led to catastrophic outcomes, including the rise of fascism and the Second World War. The question now is whether China is willing and able to fill any emerging gap.

Jessica: I believe China is fully aware of facing three metaphorical traps: the Thucydides Trap, the Kindleberger Trap, and the middle-income trap. Of those three, I agree with Joe Nye that the Thucydides Trap is unlikely to guide the future of U.S.-China relations.

However, that leaves the Kindleberger Trap and middle-income trap as challenges China confronts. For over 70 years, the U.S. has been the supplier of global public goods, and now, as the U.S. withdraws from that role, I don’t think China is prepared or capable of stepping in.

While they may seek partners to address these gaps, be it with the Europeans, known for their rule-making, or through BRICS, this remains a significant challenge for China in the coming years.

Kaiser: Jessica, another noticeable shift has been how the U.S. is responding to the situation in Ukraine and its relationship with Russia. In light of Trump’s sudden changes, how is China adjusting its stance on the conflict?

Jessica: We’re starting to see some thaw in European attitudes toward China out of necessity—not necessarily because their concerns about China’s support for Russia has changed. As the U.S. aligns more closely with Russia against Ukraine, they recognize the need to diversify their partnerships.

Yet, the critical source of uncertainty remains China’s relationship with Russia. Beijing is undoubtedly concerned, even as efforts from both sides are made to reassure that this relationship remains steady.

Ryan: I’d say good luck trying to peel China away from Russia, which seems to be a popular notion lately. During the Munich Security Conference, I noticed Wang Yi deliver a powerful speech emphasizing that the world is moving towards multipolarity and that Europe deserves a role in resolving conflicts like the one in Ukraine.

Kaiser: How do you read that?

Ryan: I recognize that the current landscape looks different from just 45 days ago. The U.S. and Europe no longer see their values aligned. The reality now is that they view the U.S. as an economic adversary and an unreliable security partner.

While I do acknowledge credit where it’s due for China’s conciliatory messages, I remain skeptical that they will profit from these major changes. As long as the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues, many Europeans will regard China as an enabler, not a solution, to the crisis.

Regarding the idea of a reverse Kissinger, I find it impractical. The scenarios we see now contrast sharply from what existed during the initial opening to China. Many analysts are trying to cultivate a narrative to align Trump’s closeness with Putin with past diplomatic strategies, but under the current circumstances, that analogy just doesn’t hold water.

Jessica: We’ve witnessed that while there may be objections to actions taken by the Trump administration, like withdrawing from WHO and the Paris Agreement, these moves don’t exactly surprise us. Framing them as victories for China instead of assessing their merit in their own context seems off base.

I agree that merely removing American presence changes the situation, but I don’t view that alone as a win for China. It also doesn’t address the vital questions about the domestic benefits of American investment in health surveillance and conflict prevention.

Until these questions are answered, insisting on losing competition to China is unlikely to resonate. As we’ve seen, Trump’s campaign didn’t focus on outcompeting China the way the Biden administration does. Framing these shifts in terms of losses to China seems ineffective and flawed.

It’s almost like saying, “The arsonist has burned down our library, and now the other guy has more books than us.” That’s a real issue indeed. Kaiser: Let’s move to the Western Pacific. Jessica, we’ve discussed how the Biden administration at least recognizes the importance of alliances, even if there are differing opinions on how those alliances are applied in that region.

Now, let’s look at how the Trump administration’s approach has sparked significant concern among our traditional allies, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Recently, Chinese naval vessels conducted live-fire exercises in the waters between Australia and New Zealand within the Australian EEZ.

What’s the sentiment in the region? How are various countries, including U.S. allies and ASEAN states that aren’t formally allied, navigating this uncertain terrain shaped by Trump’s policies?

Jessica: Great question. There are numerous angles to consider. On one hand, there’s some relief that this isn’t the U.S. trying to forcibly categorize the world into democracies versus autocracies—a strategy that didn’t resonate well in Southeast Asia.

However, there’s also a genuine fear among U.S. allies that they might face extortion or abandonment. So, there’s a concerted effort to maintain cordiality with the new administration. Still, responses aren’t uniform across the board.

In some countries, there are significant groups that support Trump and express pro-American sentiments. It’s quite a mixed picture, and we’ll need to see how it evolves. I think the worries surrounding American security guarantees could lead to troubling outcomes, particularly regarding proliferation.

Kaiser: Understandably so. I’d love to delve more into this, but for the sake of time, let’s shift our focus to Taiwan. Ryan, you recently had a great Twitter thread discussing Taiwan’s reaction to Trump’s shift on Ukraine. From the outset, many have drawn parallels to Taiwan. How is Taipei interpreting this, especially with Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on goods, including semiconductors from Taiwan? What does this indicate about how allies, in general, are recalibrating their expectations of Washington, and, more specifically, Taipei itself?

Ryan: Thank you, Kaiser. In recent weeks, I’ve had extensive conversations with friends in Taipei, and they are quite shocked by recent developments, for reasons that are completely understandable. We’ve recently overturned longstanding policies regarding Ukraine, and it seems we’re turning our backs on a friend in need. This ambivalence about supporting a fellow democracy resonates deeply with our friends in Taipei, who worry about their own security.

However, I remind my friends that the analogy between Ukraine and Taiwan is not perfect, and it shouldn’t be taken too far. There are a few reasons for this. First, the geographical context is drastically different. Ukraine shares a land border with Russia, presenting a lower barrier to entry for conflict compared to the significant distance—essentially a hundred-mile moat—between China and Taiwan.

Secondly, the United States has the Taiwan Relations Act on the books, which obligates us to maintain specific capabilities and places Taiwan in a unique category of partners globally. Lastly, the most fundamental difference right now is the reality that the U.S. cannot achieve its goals without Taiwan, and vice versa. Our fates are intertwined.

For President Trump, his goal is to reindustrialize the United States, which cannot happen without chips produced in Taiwan. Ninety percent of the world’s most advanced chips come from there, and there’s no alternative to achieving our economic ambitions without a strong partnership with Taiwan.

If that doesn’t convince my friends in Taiwan, I also point out that President Trump knows that winning a Nobel Peace Prize in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely. I believe he will search for successes and breakthroughs in areas other than Taiwan. While this may not be entirely comforting for our friends in Taiwan, I think it’s essential that they retain confidence in their future and recognize that they have agency in shaping it.

Kaiser: It’s impossible to talk about the U.S.-Taiwan relationship without discussing technology and competition in that arena. Before we wrap up, I want to touch on this topic.

People have drawn vastly different conclusions from the release of DeepSeq R1 in January, which surprised many especially right here. Some assert that efforts to stifle China’s access to key technological imports have failed, claiming it only fueled Chinese ingenuity and caused them to double down on their efforts. Others believe we need to bolster our defenses, advocating for building a bigger yard and a higher fence.

So, I’m curious: what approach do you expect the Trump administration to take? Jessica, why don’t you start?

Jessica: If I had to guess, I think they would lean towards expanding the yard and reinforcing the fences, closing loopholes along the way. However, there’s a critical need for greater thought regarding the effectiveness of an export control-focused strategy aimed at maintaining a substantial lead over China, an idea echoed by Jake Sullivan. I think J.D. Vance has a similar perspective.

We hosted a recent conversation at SAIS on the evolution of AI, discussing what it means to maintain technological leadership and how far we can keep China behind us, considering advancements like DeepSeq and the evolution of technology and its applications.

If export controls cannot significantly maintain a lead, even if somewhat effective, we might need to explore alternative strategies. I question whether simply holding China back while accelerating our own progress will ever be sufficiently effective to mitigate potential risks, whatever those may be.

There’s a lot of speculation about how soon we might reach artificial general intelligence. Regardless of whether that happens, it’s essential to consider what it could mean for having a vast pool of skilled talent working on technology. Prioritizing that at the expense of other considerations could be a real misstep.

Ryan: That’s an excellent point. Recently, Foreign Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo remarked in an interview that attempting to halt Chinese innovation is a fool’s errand. Considering her oversight of the very department, BIS, tasked with enforcing these controls, do you think we’ll see a shift? Will the Trump administration yield to the pressures from major semiconductor manufacturers like Intel and NVIDIA, both domestically and internationally, including ASML? Or will they choose to build a taller wall and wider yard?

Ryan: It’s a good question. If I had to wager, I’d lean towards what Jessica mentioned: the instinct will be to build a higher fence and a bigger yard. That’s likely the thinking within President Trump’s staff, who will want to limit China’s advancements while accelerating our own. However, it’s uncertain how closely that instinct aligns with President Trump’s own views.

Ultimately, his perspective is what truly matters. It’s crucial to approach this with a degree of humility because whenever I listen to President Trump, I hear a desire to expand American exports, reindustrialize, and grow the American economy. His strategy revolves around strengthening tariffs, deregulating, and lowering energy costs. Technology doesn’t seem to play a central role in that strategy at present.

It could happen that his team follows the path established by President Biden. But I don’t believe the signal will come from the Oval Office. Trump appears focused on advancing American interests and reindustrialization, while indicating a notable departure from industrial policies that were just gaining momentum, like the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act.

Meanwhile, in China, insights from recent meetings reveal plans for an enormous national venture capital fund aimed at bleeding-edge technologies, with a significant commitment to biomanufacturing and 6G developments. Perhaps, Jessica, you could elaborate on the implications of this potential abandonment of industrial policy. Are my observations on this trajectory accurate?

Jessica: Ryan’s caution about overinterpreting developments is valid. The CHIPS Act implementation team is indeed facing shakeups. It’s becoming apparent that there’s growing opposition to public sector investments while private technology firms are expected to drive innovation. However, it’s unclear what this means for defining an industrial policy; it might be about capturing growth rather than directing it.

This approach differs considerably from the Biden administration’s stance, which moved cautiously towards investment but avoided appearing overly selective in supporting particular sectors. We should be prepared for these shifts as they emerge.

I want to make sure we leave time for audience questions, so let’s wrap up our recent discussions by returning to the idea of an affirmative vision for American domestic politics. What might that look like in this administration, or even looking ahead to what it could entail after this turbulent phase?

Ryan: I think we must accept that the U.S. and China will be the leading global powers for the remainder of this century. If we approach competition correctly, it can drive both nations to improve their performance. That should be our objective.

The government’s primary purpose should be to ensure the safety, prosperity, and health of the American people. Therefore, the question must become how our relationship with China can best achieve that goal. While this may not be the focus in the immediate future, we should continue developing these thoughts, as there will come a moment when the opportunity arises and we need to be prepared with a solid answer.

Jessica: I would add that there appears to be a legislative shift on both sides of the aisle towards acknowledging a post-American unipolar moment. We find ourselves in a multipolar world where the U.S. is just one integral player.

The challenge now is to define what advancing American interests means in this new context, without attempting to oversee the entire globe in ways incompatible with our capacities. So, we need to ask what outcomes, both internationally and within our bilateral relationship with China, will benefit Americans. We ought to focus on allowing future generations to feel they will have a better life than their parents did.

The affirmative vision should not rest on outpacing China but rather on ensuring our well-being, regardless of China’s performance. That doesn’t mean we can ignore shared interests, but we should avoid framing matters entirely in relative terms.

Ryan: I think it’s also vital to consider what American citizens are thinking, as they ultimately determine our country’s direction. While China dominates policy discussions, it doesn’t necessarily drive public sentiment or electoral results.

What Americans overwhelmingly support is avoiding conflict with China. I find this throughout the country; the question I hear most frequently is whether their children will need to go to war with China. This concern should serve as the foundation for any serious, forward-thinking vision of our relationship.

What resonates with me is that we should focus our efforts on reducing conflict risk with China. The more we can concentrate our attention on issues like nuclear matters, AI, space, and cyber threats, the better positioned we’ll be to find avenues of mutual benefit and progress, which will ultimately be positive.

Kaiser: You’ve raised excellent points, but I’m afraid we’re out of time. So, thank you both for joining us today. It was a pleasure to have Ryan Haas and Jessica Chenwise here at UC Berkeley. Go Bears!

Thank you, everyone, for being a part of this insightful discussion.

---

At the Coca-Cola Company, Keurig, Dr. Pepper, and PepsiCo, our bottles may look the same, but some can now be made entirely from recycled plastic. New bottles produced using no new plastic—except for the caps and labels—are on the horizon, thanks to your recycling efforts. The more bottles we collect, the less new plastic we need to use. Kaiser: Let’s move to the Western Pacific. Jessica, we’ve discussed how the Biden administration at least recognizes the importance of alliances, even if there are differing opinions on how those alliances are applied in that region.

Now, let’s examine how the Trump administration’s approach has raised significant concerns among traditional allies, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Recently, Chinese naval vessels conducted live-fire exercises in the waters between Australia and New Zealand within the Australian EEZ.

What’s the sentiment in the region? How are various countries, including U.S. allies and ASEAN states that aren’t formally allied, navigating this uncertain terrain shaped by Trump’s policies?

Jessica: Great question. There are numerous angles to consider. On one hand, there is some relief that this isn’t the U.S. trying to forcibly categorize the world into democracies versus autocracies—a strategy that hasn’t resonated well in Southeast Asia.

However, there is also a genuine fear among U.S. allies that they might face extortion or abandonment. Therefore, there’s a concerted effort to maintain cordiality with the new administration. Still, responses aren’t uniform across the board.

In some countries, there are significant groups that support Trump and express pro-American sentiments. It’s quite a mixed picture, and we will need to see how it evolves. I think the worries surrounding American security guarantees could lead to troubling outcomes, particularly regarding proliferation.

Kaiser: Understandably so. I’d love to delve more into this, but for the sake of time, let’s shift our focus to Taiwan. Ryan, you recently had a great Twitter thread discussing Taiwan’s reaction to Trump’s shift on Ukraine. From the outset, many have drawn parallels to Taiwan. How is Taipei interpreting this, especially with Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on goods, including semiconductors from Taiwan? What does this indicate about how allies, in general, are recalibrating their expectations of Washington, and more specifically, of Taipei itself?

Ryan: Thank you, Kaiser. In recent weeks, I’ve had extensive conversations with friends in Taipei, and they are quite shocked by recent developments, for reasons that are completely understandable. We’ve recently overturned longstanding policies regarding Ukraine, and it seems we’re turning our backs on a friend in need. This ambivalence about supporting a fellow democracy resonates deeply with our friends in Taipei, who worry about their own security.

However, I remind my friends that the analogy between Ukraine and Taiwan is not perfect, and it shouldn’t be taken too far. There are a few reasons for this. First, the geographical context is drastically different. Ukraine shares a land border with Russia, presenting a lower barrier to entry for conflict compared to the significant distance—essentially a hundred-mile moat—between China and Taiwan.

Secondly, the United States has the Taiwan Relations Act on the books, which obligates us to maintain specific capabilities and places Taiwan in a unique category of partners globally. Lastly, the most fundamental difference right now is the reality that the U.S. cannot achieve its goals without Taiwan, and vice versa. Our fates are intertwined.

For President Trump, his goal is to reindustrialize the United States, which cannot happen without chips produced in Taiwan. Ninety percent of the world’s most advanced chips come from there, and there’s no alternative to achieving our economic ambitions without a strong partnership with Taiwan.

If that doesn’t convince my friends in Taiwan, I also point out that President Trump knows that winning a Nobel Peace Prize in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely. I believe he will search for successes and breakthroughs in areas other than Taiwan. While this may not be entirely comforting for our friends in Taiwan, I think it’s essential that they retain confidence in their future and recognize that they have agency in shaping it.

Kaiser: It’s impossible to talk about the U.S.-Taiwan relationship without discussing technology and competition in that arena. Before we wrap up, I want to touch on this topic.

People have drawn vastly different conclusions from the release of DeepSeq R1 in January, which surprised many, especially right here. Some assert that efforts to stifle China’s access to key technological imports have failed, claiming it only fueled Chinese ingenuity and caused them to double down on their efforts. Others believe we need to bolster our defenses, advocating for building a bigger yard and a higher fence.

So, I’m curious: what approach do you expect the Trump administration to take? Jessica, why don’t you start?

Jessica: If I had to guess, I think they would lean towards expanding the yard and reinforcing the fences, closing loopholes along the way. However, there’s a critical need for greater thought regarding the effectiveness of an export control-focused strategy aimed at maintaining a substantial lead over China, an idea echoed by Jake Sullivan. I think J.D. Vance has a similar perspective.

We hosted a recent conversation at SAIS on the evolution of AI, discussing what it means to maintain technological leadership and how far we can keep China behind us, considering advancements like DeepSeq and the evolution of technology.

If export controls cannot significantly maintain a lead, even if somewhat effective, we might need to explore alternative strategies. I question whether simply holding China back while accelerating our own progress will ever be sufficiently effective to mitigate potential risks, whatever those may be.

There’s a lot of speculation about how soon we might reach artificial general intelligence. Regardless of whether that happens, it’s essential to consider what it could mean for having a vast pool of skilled talent working on technology. Prioritizing that at the expense of other considerations could be a real misstep.

Ryan: That’s an excellent point. Recently, Foreign Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo remarked in an interview that attempting to halt Chinese innovation is a fool’s errand. Considering her oversight of the very department, BIS, tasked with enforcing these controls, do you think we’ll see a shift? Will the Trump administration yield to the pressures from major semiconductor manufacturers like Intel and NVIDIA, both domestically and internationally, including ASML? Or will they choose to build a taller wall and wider yard?

Ryan: It’s a good question. If I had to wager, I’d lean towards what Jessica mentioned: the instinct will be to build a higher fence and a bigger yard. That’s likely the thinking within President Trump’s staff who will want to limit China’s advancements while accelerating our own. However, it’s uncertain how closely that instinct aligns with President Trump’s own views.

Ultimately, his perspective is what truly matters. It’s crucial to approach this with a degree of humility because whenever I listen to President Trump, I hear a desire to expand American exports, reindustrialize, and grow the American economy. His strategy revolves around strengthening tariffs, deregulating, and lowering energy costs. Technology doesn’t seem to play a central role in that strategy at present.

It could happen that his team follows the path established by President Biden. But I don’t believe the signal will come from the Oval Office. Trump appears focused on advancing American interests and reindustrialization, while indicating a notable departure from industrial policies that were just gaining momentum, like the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act.

Meanwhile, in China, insights from recent meetings reveal plans for an enormous national venture capital fund aimed at bleeding-edge technologies, with a significant commitment to biomanufacturing and 6G developments. Perhaps, Jessica, you could elaborate on the implications of this potential abandonment of industrial policy. Are my observations on this trajectory accurate?

Jessica: Ryan’s caution about overinterpreting developments is valid. The CHIPS Act implementation team is indeed facing shakeups. It’s becoming apparent that there’s growing opposition to public sector investments while private technology firms are expected to drive innovation. However, it’s unclear what this means for defining an industrial policy; it might be about capturing growth rather than directing it.

This approach differs considerably from the Biden administration’s stance, which moved cautiously towards investment but avoided appearing overly selective in supporting particular sectors. We should be prepared for these shifts as they emerge.

I want to make sure we leave time for audience questions, so let’s wrap up our recent discussions by returning to the idea of an affirmative vision for American domestic politics. What might that look like in this administration, or even looking ahead to what it could entail after this turbulent phase?

Ryan: I think we must accept that the U.S. and China will be the leading global powers for the remainder of this century. If we approach competition correctly, it can drive both nations to improve their performance. That should be our objective.

The government’s primary purpose should be to ensure the safety, prosperity, and health of the American people. Therefore, the question must become how our relationship with China can best achieve that goal. While this may not be the focus in the immediate future, we should continue developing these thoughts, as there will come a moment when the opportunity arises and we need to be prepared with a solid answer.

Jessica: I would add that there appears to be a legislative shift on both sides of the aisle towards acknowledging a post-American unipolar moment. We find ourselves in a multipolar world where the U.S. is just one integral player.

The challenge now is to define what advancing American interests means in this new context, without attempting to oversee the entire globe in ways incompatible with our capacities. So, we need to ask what outcomes, both internationally and within our bilateral relationship with China, will benefit Americans. We ought to focus on allowing future generations to feel they will have a better life than their parents did.

The affirmative vision should not rest on outpacing China but rather on ensuring our well-being, regardless of China’s performance. That doesn’t mean we can ignore shared interests, but we should avoid framing matters entirely in relative terms.

Ryan: I think it’s also vital to consider what American citizens are thinking, as they ultimately determine our country’s direction. While China dominates policy discussions, it doesn’t necessarily drive public sentiment or electoral results.

What Americans overwhelmingly support is avoiding conflict with China. I find this throughout the country; the question I hear most frequently is whether their children will need to go to war with China. This concern should serve as the foundation for any serious, forward-thinking vision of our relationship.

What resonates with me is that we should focus our efforts on reducing conflict risk with China. The more we can concentrate our attention on issues like nuclear matters, AI, space, and cyber threats, the better positioned we’ll be to find avenues of mutual benefit and progress, which will ultimately be positive.

Kaiser: You’ve raised excellent points, but I’m afraid we’re out of time. So, thank you both for joining us today. It was a pleasure to have Ryan Haas and Jessica Chenwise here at UC Berkeley. Go Bears!

Thank you, everyone, for being a part of this insightful discussion.